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ABSTRACT
In the past, industrial countries have tended to pursue countercyclical or, at worst, acyclical fiscal policy.
In sharp contrast, emerging and developing countries have followed procyclical fiscal policy, thus
exacerbating the underlying business cycle. We show that, over the last decade, about a third of the
developing world has been able to escape the procyclicality trap and actually become countercyclical.
We then focus on the role played by the quality of institutions, which appears to be a key determinant
of a country’s ability to graduate. We show that, even after controlling for the endogeneity of institutions
and other determinants of …scal procyclicality, there is a causal link running from stronger institutions
to less procyclical or more countercyclical fiscal policy.
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The cyclical behavior of ￿scal policy di⁄ers across countries by income group. In the past, while
industrial countries have tended to pursue ￿scal policy that is countercyclical or at worst acyclical,
developing countries have tended to follow procyclical ￿scal policy: they have increased spending (or
cut taxes) during periods of expansion and cut spending (or raised taxes) during periods of recession.
Many authors have documented that ￿scal policy has tended to be more procyclical in developing coun-
tries than industrialized countries.1 Most studies look at the procyclicality of government spending,
because tax receipts are endogenous with respect to the business cycle. Indeed, an important reason
for procyclical spending is precisely that government receipts from taxes or mineral royalties rise in
booms, and the government cannot resist the temptation or political pressures to increase spending
proportionately, or even more than proportionately. A similar procyclical pattern can be found on
the tax side by focusing on tax rates rather than revenues, though cross-country evidence is harder to
come by. Vegh and Vuletin (2012a) ￿nd that tax rate policy has been mostly procyclical in developing
countries and acyclical in industrialized countries.
In terms of government spending, the contrast between the two groups of countries can be clearly
seen in Figure 1, which updates evidence presented in Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004). The
￿gure depicts the correlation between (the cyclical components of) government spending and GDP for
94 countries (21 developed and 73 developing countries) for the period 1960-2009. Black bars represent
industrial countries while light bars represent developing countries. A positive (negative) correlation
indicates procyclical (countercyclical) government spending.2 The visual image tells the whole story:
light bars lie overwhelmingly on the right hand side (positive correlations) while black bars dominate
the left hand side (negative correlations). Indeed, more than 90 percent of developing countries (67
out of 73) show procyclical government spending, while around 80 percent of industrial countries (17
1See Gavin and Perotti (1997), Tornell and Lane (1999), Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004), Talvi and Vegh
(2005), Mendoza and Oviedo (2006), Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008), and Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008).
2Needless to say, correlations do not tell us anything about causality which, in principle, could go in either direction.
Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008), however, show that, even when properly instrumented, output does cause government spending,
as emphasized by the ￿scal procyclicality literature.
2out of 21) show countercyclical government spending.
Why would policymakers pursue procyclical ￿scal policy? After all, such policy cannot be optimal
since it will tend to reinforce the business cycle, exacerbating booms and aggravating busts. The most
convincing explanations in the literature fall in two, not necessarily inconsistent, camps: (i) imperfect
access to international credit markets and lack of ￿nancial depth (Gavin, Hausmann, Perotti and
Talvi, 1996; Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Riascos and Vegh, 2003; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2004)
and (ii) political distortions (Velasco, 1997; Tornell and Lane, 1999; Talvi and Vegh, 2005).3 Lack
of access to credit markets in bad times will naturally leave governments with no choice but to cut
spending and raise taxes, whereas political pressures for additional spending in good times are hard to
resist, particularly when there may exist a genuine need for more government spending in critical social
areas. Improving access to credit in bad times (including o¢ cial ￿nancial assistance from multilateral
￿nancial institutions such as the IMF) and designing rules and institutions that aim at ensuring that
￿scal revenues are saved in good times so that they are available in bad times would go a long way to
alleviate the scourge of procyclical ￿scal policy.
In fact ￿and as we will argue in this paper ￿over the last decade several developing countries
have been able to ￿graduate￿in the sense of overcoming the problem of procyclicality and becoming
countercyclical.4 Theoretical work by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) and Nakata (2011)
clearly suggests that this shift in the cyclical properties of ￿scal policy is welfare improving since
the optimal ￿scal policy in a stochastic model with sticky prices is countercycical. In fact, both
papers show that countercyclical ￿scal policy is even more e⁄ective when monetary policy has become
powerless because the policy interest rate has hit the zero bound. Intuitively, suppose the economy is
hit systematically (in a stochastic sense) by, say, shocks to the discount factor. In bad times (when the
preference shock induces household to save more), it becomes optimal for the government to increase
spending (even to the point of making the zero bound marginally non-binding if it was binding to
3Calder￿n and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008) provide evidence for the empirical relevance of these two channels.
4Our work can be viewed as complementing, on the ￿scal side, recent work by Reinhart, Rogo⁄, and Qiang (2010)
who study graduation from default, in￿ation, and banking crises, and Vegh and Vuletin (2012b) who study graduation
from monetary procyclicality.
3begin with).5
Chile is undoubtedly the poster child of this graduation movement. As discussed in Frankel (2012),
since 2001 Chile has followed a ￿scal rule that has a structural (i.e., cyclically-adjusted) ￿scal balance
as its target.6 By construction, such a rule ensures that temporarily high ￿scal revenues are saved
rather than spent. But, as we will show below, Chile is not the only country that seems to have escaped
the procyclicality trap.
Our analysis con￿rms previous ￿ndings in the literature regarding the role of increased ￿nancial
integration and lower output volatility in reducing ￿scal procyclicality. The paper￿ s main focus,
however, is on the role played by the quality of institutions. We argue that the quality of institutions
seems to be a key determinant of a country￿ s ability to graduate and show evidence that as the quality
of institutions increases over time, the level of procyclicality falls.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 shows the shift in ￿scal policy in many emerging and
developing countries over the last decade. Section 3 traces this shift to the quality of institutions and
presents some basic regressions that establish a negative correlation between ￿scal procyclicality and
the quality of institutions. Moreover, we show that a marked improvement in institutional quality
witnessed during the last 25 years in some developing countries seems to be at the root of their
￿graduation.￿Sections 4 and 5 go a step further and control for other determinants of procyclicality
and address endogeneity concerns. We show that there is a strong case to be made that causality indeed
runs from the quality of institutions to less procyclical or countercyclical ￿scal policy. Concluding
remarks can be found in Section 6.
5Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) derive this result taking monetary policy as given. Nakata (2011),
however, shows that countercyclical ￿scal policy is optimal even if monetary policy is chosen optimally.
6The original target was a structural surplus of 1 percent, re￿ecting the need to repay Central Bank debt associated
with the bailout of private banks in the 1980s. As this debt was paid o⁄ over time, the targeted structural balance was
reduced to 0.5 percent in 2008 and 0 percent in 2009.
42 Graduating class
This section documents the important shift in the cyclical behavior of ￿scal policy over the last decade
in the developing world. To this end, we divided the 1960-2009 sample used in Figure 1 into two sub-
samples: 1960-1999 and 2000-2009. Figure 2 replicates Figure 1 for the period 1960-1999 and conveys
essentially the same message. Figure 3, on the other hand, focuses on the period 2000-2009. Once
again, the visual image conveyed by Figure 3 is striking when compared to Figure 2. Speci￿cally, the
number of light bars on the left-side of the picture (i.e., negative correlations) has greatly increased.
Around 35 percent of developing countries (26 out of 73) now show a countercyclical ￿scal policy, up
from 8 percent (6 out of 73) in Figure 2.
To illustrate graduation, Figure 4 presents a scatter plot with the 1960-1999 correlation on the
horizontal axis and the 2000-2009 correlation on the vertical axis. By dividing the scatter plot into
four quadrants along the zero axes, we can classify countries into four categories:
1. Established graduates (bottom-left): These are countries that have always been countercyclical.
Not surprisingly, 87 percent of the countries in this category are industrial countries, including
the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia.
2. Still in school (top-right) These are countries that have continued to behave procyclically over
the last decade. Again not surprisingly, 96 percent of these countries are developing countries,
including Venezuela, Peru, and India.
3. Back to school (top-left): These are countries that were countercyclical during the 1960-1999
period and turned procyclical over the last decade. This small group of countries is split fairly
evenly between developed and developing countries. It includes Greece and Jamaica.
4. Recent graduates (bottom-right): These are countries that used to be procyclical and became
countercyclical over the last decade. They are mostly represented by developing countries (24
out of 26, or 96 percent) and include Chile, Brazil, and Botswana.
5In sum, the evidence suggests that about a third of the developing world (24 out of 73 countries)
has recently ￿graduated￿from procyclicality.
The evidence of countercyclicality among many emerging market and developing countries matches
up with other criteria for judging maturity in the conduct of ￿scal policy: debt-GDP ratios, rankings
by rating agencies, and sovereign spreads. Low income and emerging market countries in the aggregate
have achieved debt-GDP levels around 40 percent of GDP over the last four years. The IMF estimates
the 2011 ratio at 43 percent among emerging market countries and 35 percent among low-income
countries. This is the same period during which debt in advanced countries has risen from about 70
per cent of GDP to 102 percent. The ￿nancial markets have rati￿ed the historic turnaround. Spreads
are now lower for many emerging markets than for some ￿advanced countries.￿ As of early 2012,
Singapore has a higher credit rating than France or the US; Chile has a higher credit rating than
Japan; Korea and China have higher credit ratings than Spain; Malaysia, South Africa, Brazil, and
Thailand all have higher ratings than Italy; Colombia has a higher rating than Iceland or Ireland;
Indonesia and the Philippines have higher ratings than Portugal; and various African countries have
higher ratings than Greece.
Largely as a result of their improved ￿scal situations during the period 2000-2007, many emerging
markets were able to bounce back from the 2008-2009 global ￿nancial crisis more quickly than advanced
countries.7
3 Graduation and institutional quality
What explains the ability of some countries, particularly emerging market and developing countries,
to escape the trap of procyclical ￿scal policy? Many researchers have pointed to the importance of
institutions in determining various aspects of public policy.8 In this spirit, this section shows that
institutional quality (IQ) explains some of the most recent changes in cyclicality of ￿scal policy. To
7See, for example, Didier, Hevia, and Schmukler (2012).
8The importance of institutions for ￿scal policy has been emphasized by Buchanan (1967), von Hagen and Harden
(1995), Alesina and Perotti (1996), Poterba and Von Hagen (1999), Persson and Tabellini (2004), and Calder￿n and
Schmidt-Hebbel (2008), among others.
6this e⁄ect, we construct an index of IQ by calculating the average of four normalized variables from
the International Country Risk Guide dataset:
￿ Investment pro￿le: An assessment of factors a⁄ecting investment risk that are not covered by
other political, economic and ￿nancial risk components. The risk rating assigned is the sum of
three subcomponents: contract viability/expropriation, pro￿ts repatriation, and payment delays.
￿ Corruption: An assessment of corruption within the political system.
￿ Law and order: An assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system and the
popular observance of the law.
￿ Bureaucratic quality: An assessment of the strength and expertise to govern without drastic
changes in policy or interruptions in government services.
The IQ index ranges between 0 (lowest institutional quality) and 1 (highest institutional quality).
We ￿rst establish a link between the four way classi￿cation in Figure 4 and IQ. To this e⁄ect,
Column 1 in Table 1 reports the average IQ for each of these groups. As hypothesized, the highest
IQ is for the ￿established graduates￿ group. Next is the ￿back to school￿ group with an average
index of 0.6, followed by the ￿recent graduates￿group with an average index of 0.55. The ￿still in
school￿countries have the lowest institutional quality (0.48). All these IQ di⁄erences are statistically
signi￿cant at the 1 percent level.
We then construct a scatter plot relating IQ and procyclicality, shown in Figure 5. We can see a
clear negative relationship between IQ and cyclicality of ￿scal policy. The higher (lower) the IQ in
a country, the more countercyclical (procyclical) is ￿scal policy. Based on the estimated regression,
an IQ level of 0.79 supports acyclicality. A higher (lower) level of IQ supports countercyclicality
(procyclicality).
In order to further explore the importance of IQ in the process of graduation from procyclicality,
we decompose IQ values in each country into two components;  and ￿.  refers to
7the initial (or earliest) IQ observed. In most countries this value corresponds to the IQ level in 1984.9
￿ is then de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the current IQ value and . In other words,
￿ ￿IQ¬. Columns 2 and 3 in Table 1 show the average  and ￿ for each of
these groups.
We should take the ￿ndings for the ￿back to school￿group with a grain of salt given the small sample
included in this group; only 8 countries (see top-left quadrant in Figure 4). Column 2 shows that, as
expected, the highest initial IQ (0.84) is for the ￿established graduates￿group. Mean tests support
the idea that initial IQ for ￿established graduates￿is statistically higher than for the other graduating
categories at the 1 percent level. ￿Still in school￿ and ￿recent graduates￿ have initial IQ values
that are statistically indistinguishable from each other. Column 3 of Table 1 shows that ￿established
graduates￿have the highest IQ inertia; i.e., lowest ￿ values in absolute terms. Moreover, this group
has seen a slight decline in IQ in recent times. On the other hand, ￿recent graduates￿is the group
with the highest recent increase in IQ. Mean tests support the idea that ￿ for ￿recent graduates￿
is statistically higher than for the other graduating categories at the 1 percent level. To sum up,
￿established graduates￿have the highest initial IQ and show no major improvements over time. Both
￿still in school￿and ￿recent graduates￿share similar initial IQ conditions. However, the increase in
IQ recently observed is much higher in ￿recent graduates￿than the one observed in ￿still in school.￿
Although one thinks of institutions as slow-moving, they can change over time. Figure 6 provides
some examples of the within-country relation between IQ and cyclicality of ￿scal policy by plotting for
three di⁄erent countries the correlation between government spending and GDP computed over a 20-
year rolling window and the level of IQ. Panel A shows the case of Australia, an ￿established graduate.￿
IQ levels have been consistently around 0.80 and ￿scal policy has always been countercyclical. At the
other extreme, Panel B shows the case of Venezuela, a ￿still in school￿country. IQ levels have ranged
between 0.24 and 0.58 and ￿scal policy has been consistently procyclical. Panel C shows the case
of Chile, a ￿recent graduate.￿The IQ increased from values close to 0.5 in the early 1980s to more
9The only exceptions are Rep. of Congo (1985), Gambia (1985), Niger (1985), Sierra Leone (1985), Yemen (1990),
and Azerbaijan (1998).
8than 0.8 since the mid 2000s. In line with our arguments, ￿scal policy shifted from being strongly
procyclical ￿with values close to Venezuela￿ s ￿to countercyclical.
Chile￿ s experience is a good illustration of how a country with good IQ in the general sense of
rule of law can help lock in countercyclical ￿scal policy through speci￿c budget institutions. Frankel
(2012) analyzes how Chile did it, with the structural budget reforms of 2000 and 2006. Fiscal rules,
such as euroland￿ s Stability and Growth Pact, often accomplish little in themselves, because they are
not necessarily enforced or credible. Rules can even worsen the general tendency of governments to
make overly optimistic forecasts for economic growth and budget balance.10 Chile￿ s key innovation was
to give responsibility for forecasting to independent experts commissions, insulated from politicians￿
wishful thinking. Its approach could be emulated by others.
Finally, we use panel data regressions to exploit within-country variability as opposed to cross-
country variability. Table 2, column 1 shows the estimates for ￿2 and ￿3 when estimating the following
equation

 = ￿1 + ￿2
 + ￿3 (
 ￿ ) + ￿4 + ￿ +  (1)
where  and  are the cyclical components of government spending and output. Our main result
continues to hold: an increase in IQ reduces the degree of procyclicality. In line with our cross-
country regression (see Figure 5), we ￿nd an IQ threshold of 0.79 for graduation. Our results do
not change when we allow each coe¢ cient in equation (1) to vary by graduating class, as reported
in Columns 2a-2d. The only case for which our main results are not supported is for ￿established
graduates.￿This is mainly due to the small sample (15 countries) and, more importantly, to the small
within-country variability of IQ described before for this set of countries.
We now decompose the variable IQ into its initial value , which is constant over time,
and ￿, which varies over time. Table 2, column 3 shows the estimates for ￿2, ￿3 and ￿4 when
10Frankel (2011).
9estimating the following equation









 ￿ ￿) + ￿5
 + ￿6￿ + ￿ +  (2)
The underlying idea is to ￿nd out whether it is the highly inertial/static component of IQ that
matters for ￿scal policy ￿￿ la Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) ￿or the dynamic component
of IQ. For the whole sample (column 3) both factors, historical as well as more recent changes in IQ,
seem to matter. Our results do not change when we allow each coe¢ cient in equation (2) to vary by
graduating class, as reported in Columns 4a-4d. Some interesting asymmetries emerge between the
￿still in school￿and ￿recent graduate￿categories. Column 4b indicates that for the ￿still in school￿
group, historical factors dominate. This is consistent with very static IQ measures (compared to those
of ￿recent graduates￿ ) during the last 25 years. Instead, for the￿recent graduates￿group, it is the
more recent change in IQ (i.e., ￿) that seems to be mainly driving the results. This suggests that
changes in IQ are an important determinant of graduation.
Our analysis so far has suggested that IQ is an important determinant of procyclical ￿scal policy. In
particular, we have put forward the notion that about a third of developing countries have graduated
from ￿scal procyclicality due to important improvements in IQ during the last decade. Our analysis,
however, could su⁄er from both omitted variables and endogeneity problems. The next two sections
address these concerns.
4 Other determinants of cyclicality
While it seems natural to think that institutions a⁄ect the way in which ￿scal policy is conducted, our
￿ndings so far could re￿ ect the e⁄ect of omitted variables that are related to institutions. To address
this concern, we include in our panel regressions three sets of control variables aimed at capturing
alternative theories regarding cyclicality of ￿scal policy.
First, we control for the degree of ￿nancial integration and depth. Among others, Gavin, Hausmann,
10Perotti and Talvi (1996), Gavin and Perotti (1997), and Riascos and Vegh (2003) have argued that
limited access to international capital markets (particularly in bad times) may limit the ability of
governments to pursue countercyclical policies. In the same spirit, Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2004) have stressed the role of ￿nancial depth. We measure ￿nancial integration using the Chinn-
Ito ￿nancial openness index (Menzie and Ito, 2006) and ￿nancial depth using liquid liabilities over
GDP (Levine, Loayza and Beck, 2000; Loayza and Ranciere, 2006; Levine, Beck and Demirguc-Kunt,
2010).11 The panel data correlation between the Chinn-Ito ￿nancial openness index and IQ is 0.55; the
panel data correlation between liquid liabilities and IQ is 0.53. Table 3, columns 2 and 3 show that more
￿nancial integration and depth are indeed associated with more countercyclicality/less procyclicality.
Second, we control for the variability of tax revenues ￿proxied by output variability ￿to account
for the channel emphasized by Talvi and Vegh (2005) who argue that, in the presence of political
distortions, the larger is the variability of tax revenues the more procyclical ￿scal policy will be, as
policymakers try to reduce the ￿scal surplus in good times to prevent wasteful spending. We measure
output variability using the square of the cyclical component of real GDP.12 In Table 3, column 4
shows that, as in Lane (2003), higher output volatility does indeed increase the degree of procyclicality
of ￿scal policy.
Third, we address political economy arguments that stress common pool problems and fragmented
policymaking (Velasco, 1997; Tornell and Lane, 1999). For these purposes, we use a measure of political
checks and balances from the Database on Political institutions.13 Stronger checks and balances
constrain politicians in their policy space. Politicians are also held more accountable to the public,
relative to an autocratic regime. In a more democratic regime, the expected returns to rent-seeking
activities are lower. In Table 3, column 5 shows that stronger checks and balances decrease the degree
of procyclicality of ￿scal policy.
We also test whether debt-GDP ratios and foreign reserves holdings (in months of imports) matter
for ￿scal behavior over the business cycle. Recent low debt-GDP ratios and massive foreign reserves
11Similar results follow if private credit is used instead of liquid liabilities.
12The panel data correlation between output variability and IQ is -0.19.
13The panel data correlation between checks and balances and IQ is 0.43.
11in emerging markets may have contributed to reduce those countries￿default risk, allowing them to
run countercyclical ￿scal policies. In Table 3, columns 6 and 7 support these presumptions.
In Table 3, column 8 shows that even after accounting for standard determinants of ￿scal cyclicality,
institutional quality remains a strong determinant. There is no indication that problems related to
omitted variables are driving our results.
5 Addressing endogeneity
This section addresses potential endogeneity problems. One could argue that the observed negative
relationship between ￿scal policy cyclicality and IQ may re￿ ect the fact that countercyclical (procycli-
cal) ￿scal policies that tend to stabilize (destabilize) the economy might improve (worsen) institutional
quality. That is to say, the causality may run from cyclicality of ￿scal policies to institutional quality
and not the other way around. For example, procyclical ￿scal policies could increase the chances of gov-
ernments running into debt sustainability problems during busts. These critical ￿nancing needs could
then lead to expropriation, repudiation of contracts, and/or intervention in independent branches of
governments such as the judiciary system or the central bank. Moreover, the turmoil typically associ-
ated with debt crises can exacerbate corruption in the political system thus weakening the foundations
of an e¢ cient and professional public administration. Similar arguments could also be made regarding
the endogeneity of the control variables included in Section 4. For example, one could argue that it
is procyclical ￿scal policies that ultimately increase output volatility instead of the latter being the
cause of procyclical ￿scal policies.
We address such endogeneity concerns by instrumenting not only for IQ but also for the other six
control variables. The literature on institutions has not found yet time-varying instrumental variables
for the quality of institutions. Hence ￿and as is standard in this literature ￿we rely on cross-country
regressions (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Glaeser, La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2004; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi, 2004; La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer, 2008).
12We follow Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson￿ s (2001) approach to instrument average IQ using
European settlers￿mortality and latitude (absolute value). They argue that European mortality rates
(recorded among soldiers, bishops, and sailors stationed in the colonies) between the 17th and 19th
centuries shaped, at least in part, the type of settlements and colonization strategy. In places where
Europeans faced high mortality rates, they could not settle and they were more likely to set up worse
(extractive) institutions. An archetypal example of this strategy is the Belgian colonization of the
Congo. On the other hand, low mortality rates supported the development of important European
settlements. In these ￿neo-europe￿states, the settlers tried to replicate European institutions, with
emphasis on private property, and checks against government power. Primary examples include Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States. Assuming high path dependence, early sound
institutions would endure over time until the present.
We instrument ￿nancial integration and depth using legal origin (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), output volatility using terms of trade volatility, and indebtedness using
debt-GDP ratio in 1900. We instrument checks and balances using constraints on the executive and
democracy in 1900. The constraints on the executive in 1900 range from cases in which there are no
regular limitations on the executive￿ s actions to situations in which accountability groups have e⁄ec-
tive authority equal to or greater than the executive in most activities. Democracy in 1900 comprises
several dimensions of political competitiveness.
It has been argued that, in light of the severe real dislocations resulting from international ￿nancial
crises, many developing countries accumulate reserves as a form of self-insurance against capital ￿ ow
volatility (Aizenman and Marion, 2003; Stiglitz, 2006). Following this rationale, we instrument foreign
reserves using average frequency of currency crashes in mid 20th century; in particular, for the period
1940-1960.
Table 4 shows the cross-country correlations between all pairs of variables used in the analysis.
With the exeption of foreign reserves, the ￿ndings support our panel data regressions results reported
above in that higher IQ, ￿nancial integration and depth, and checks and balances are associated
13with countercyclicality, and higher output volatility and debt-GDP ratios are related to procyclicality.
Instruments are also correlated as expected, both among themselves and with the variables they will
be instrumenting for.
Table 5 shows, as in Lane (2003), OLS cross-country regressions where the dependent variable is
the correlation between the cyclical components of real government expenditure and GDP. Columns 1
to 14 analyze the impact of each variable one at a time, both for the sample of 94 countries used so
far in the paper as well as for the smaller sample of 52 countries that will be used in our instrumental
variables regressions.
Two results are worth noting. First, with the exception of foreign reserves and debt-GDP ratios,
cross-country regressions support our panel data regression ￿ndings. That is to say, higher IQ, ￿nan-
cial integration and depth, and checks and balances increase countercyclicality and output volatility
increases procyclicality. Second, the results obtained for the sample of 94 countries also hold for the
smaller sample of countries that will be used in our instrumental variables regressions. Columns 15 and
16 include all control variables together. As in our panel regressions, institutional quality is strongly
signi￿cant in all cases.
Next, we address endogeneity problems. Table 6 shows how the proposed instruments relate to
all seven cyclicality regressors. As shown by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), European
settlers￿mortality is positively related to IQ. So is latitude. Similar results are obtained for ￿nancial
integration and depth. Moreover, as suggested by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny
(1997), countries with British legal origin show higher development of their ￿nancial markets than
those of French origin. Terms of trade volatility seems to be a good predictor of output volatility, and
constraints on the executive and democracy in 1900 are found to be strongly related to recent checks
and balances. Debt-GDP ratios in 1900 and currency crashes in mid 20th century are also strong
predictors of debt-GDP ratios and foreign reserves, respectively. Indeed, the suggested instruments
have very high predictive power overall: the 2 ranges from 0.25 and 0.32 for foreign reserves and
debt-GDP ratios to almost 0.7 for institutional quality.
14Having checked that the proposed instruments seem to be good predictors for the variables they
are instrumenting for, we proceed to estimate instrumental variables regressions. Table 7 shows the
corresponding regressions. Columns 1 to 7 only instrument for IQ. Column 1 only includes IQ as
regressor. Columns 2 to 7 sequencially add other determinants. In all cases we cannot reject the
overidenti￿cation tests. The instruments are valid instruments (i.e., uncorrelated with the error term)
and the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. As suggested in
Table 6, all instrumental variable regressions con￿rm that the excluded instruments are not weak
instruments (i.e., they are strongly correlated with the endogenous regressors). We thus conclude that
institutional quality remains a critical determinant of procyclicality even after accounting for possible
endogeneity problems.
Finally, the regression shown in Table 7, column 8, corrects for the endogeneity of the rest of
the right-hand variables. IQ remains strongly negatively related to the cyclicality of ￿scal policy
con￿rming that there is a strong causal link running from better institutions to less procyclical/more
countercyclical ￿scal policy.
6 Conclusions
We have shown that, over the past decade, a substantial number of emerging and developing countries
have ￿graduated￿ from ￿scal procyclicality in the sense of being able to shift from procyclical to
countercyclical ￿scal policy. Further, we have argued that a critical determinant of whether a country
has been able to graduate or not is institutional quality. We have formally linked the degree of ￿scal
procyclicality to institutional quality and shown that, even when correcting for endogeneity and other
determinants, there is a strong causal link running from better institutions to less procyclical/more
countercyclical ￿scal policy.
While institutional change is certainly not easy and often occurs only slowly over time, the payo⁄
in terms of enabling countries to escape the ￿scal procyclicality trap can be large. Chile is perhaps the
best example of a country that has succeeded in developing stronger ￿scal institutions over time and,
15as result, has been able to conduct countercyclical ￿scal policy over the last decade. This graduation
process, however, can be a long and arduous road and does require clear economic leadership and a
strong political consensus.
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19Appendix 1. Definition of variables and sources 
 
 
Gross Domestic Product 
World Economic Outlook (WEO-IMF) and International Financial Statistics (IFS-IMF) were the main data sources. Series 
NGDP (gross domestic product, current prices) for WEO and 99B for IFS-IMF. For Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, 




World Economic Outlook (WEO-IMF) was the main data source, series GCENL (central government, total expenditure 
and net lending). Due to unavailability of central government data, general government data were used for Azerbaijan, 
Ecuador, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates. For Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, and United 
Arab Emirates data were provided by the Middle East Department at the IMF. For Brazil data was from Instituto de 
Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA). Data period covers 1960-2009. 
 
GDP deflator 
World Economic Outlook (WEO-IMF) and International Financial Statistics (IFS-IMF) were the main data sources. Series 
NGDP_D (gross domestic product deflator) for WEO-IMF and 99BIP for IFS-IMF. For Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Libya, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates data were provided by the Middle East Department at the IMF. Data period covers 
1960-2009. 
 
Financial depth  
Measured as liquid liabilities over GDP. Loayza and Ranciere (2006) and Levine et al (2010) were the main data sources. 
Data period covers 1960-2006. 
 
Financial integration  
Measured with the Chinn-Ito financial openness index; Chinn and Ito (2006). Such index measures a country's degree of 
capital account openness. Data period covers 1970-2009. 
 
Debt-GDP ratio and Debt-GDP ratio in 1900 
World Economic Outlook (WEO-IMF), World Development Indicators (WDI-World Bank), and Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2011) were the main data sources. Measured as total central government debt over GDP at the beginning of year. For 
Azerbaijan we used public and publicly guaranteed debt service. For Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti, Italy, Kuwait, Myanmar, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Singapore, Tanzania, and United Arab Emirates we used total 
general government debt. If country was not independent in 1900, we used the colonizer's respective ratio when measuring 
1900 Debt-GDP ratios. 
 
Foreign reserves 
World Development Indicators (WDI-World Bank) and International Financial Statistics (IFS-IMF) were the main data 
sources. Total reserves comprise holdings of monetary gold, special drawing rights, reserves of IMF members held by the 
IMF, and holdings of foreign exchange under the control of monetary authorities. The gold component of these reserves is 
valued at year-end (December 31) London prices. This item shows reserves expressed in terms of the number of months of 
imports of goods and services they could pay for [Reserves/(Imports/12)] at the end of previous year. 
 
Currency crashes in mid 20th century 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and authors' calculations based on exchange rate data from Global Financial Data were the 
main data sources. An episode of currency crash is counted for the entire period in which annual depreciations exceed the 
threshold of 15 percent per annum. We calculate the average frequency of currency crashes for the period 1940-1960. 
 
Terms of trade of goods and services 
World Economic Outlook (WEO-IMF) was the main data source. Series TT  (terms of trade, goods & services) for WEO. 
Data period covers 1962-2009. 
 
Institutional quality 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) was the source of data. Institutional quality is a normalized index that ranges 
between 0 (lowest institutional quality) and 1 (highest institutional quality). The index was calculated by the authors as the 
average of four components: investment profile, corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic quality. Data period covers 
1984-2008. 
 
Checks and balances 
Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh (2001) was the source of data. An 18-category scale, from 1 to 18, with a higher 
score indicating more political checks and balances. Data period covers 1975-2009. 
 
 
 European settler mortality 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) was the source of data. Mortality rates of soldiers, bishops, and sailors stationed 
in the colonies between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. 
 
Latitude  
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) was the source of data. Absolute value of the latitude of the country (i.e., a 
measure of distance from the equator), scaled to take values between 0 and 1, where 0 is the equator. 
 
Colonial dummies 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) was the source of data. Dummy indicating whether country was a British, 
French, German, Spanish, Italian, Belgian, Dutch, or Portuguese colony. 
 
French legal origin dummy 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) was the source of data. Legal origin of the company law or commercial code of 
each country.  
 
Constraint on executive in 1900 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) was the source of data. Seven-category scale, from 1 to 7, with a higher score 
indicating more constraints. Score of 1 indicates unlimited authority; score of 3 indicates slight to moderate limitations; 
score of 5 indicates substantial limitations; score of 7 indicates executive parity or subordination. Equal to 1 if country was 
not independent at that date.  
 
Democracy in 1900  
An 11-category scale, from 0 to 10, with a higher score indicating more democracy. Points from three dimensions: 
Competitiveness of Political Participation (from 1 to 3); Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (from 1 to 2, with a 
bonus of 1 point if there is an election); and Constraints on Chief Executive (from 1 to 4). Equal to 1 if country not 
independent at that date.  
 
 Appendix 2. Data on cyclicality of fiscal policy and institutions 
 
Average Average Average
1960-2009 1960-1999 2000-2009 1984-2008
Algeria RG 0.35 0.48 -0.56 0.46
Angola SS 0.33 0.16 0.67 0.41
Argentina SS 0.24 0.31 0.01 0.54
Australia* EG -0.42 -0.41 -0.79 0.87
Austria* EG -0.36 -0.41 -0.21 0.89
Azerbaijan SS 0.90 0.98 0.65 0.48
Bahrain RG 0.26 0.63 -0.11 0.64
Bangladesh SS 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.31
Belgium* EG -0.09 -0.09 -0.16 0.85
Bolivia RG 0.20 0.24 -0.87 0.38
Botswana RG 0.80 0.92 -0.32 0.66
Brazil RG 0.15 0.16 -0.18 0.54
Cameroon SS 0.77 0.80 0.02 0.47
Canada* EG -0.19 -0.09 -0.81 0.92
Chile RG 0.20 0.27 -0.64 0.66
China SS 0.26 0.18 0.73 0.56
Colombia SS 0.04 0.00 0.17 0.46
Congo, Dem. Rep. of BS -0.10 -0.19 0.85 0.18
Congo, Rep. of SS 0.33 0.34 0.31 0.39
Costa Rica RG 0.26 0.35 -0.69 0.61
Côte d'Ivoire RG 0.57 0.61 -0.16 0.48
Denmark* EG -0.06 -0.04 -0.31 0.92
Dominican Rep. SS 0.57 0.57 0.63 0.49
Ecuador SS 0.24 0.26 0.12 0.50
Egypt SS 0.22 0.24 0.02 0.48
El Salvador RG 0.07 0.04 -0.04 0.39
Finland* EG -0.56 -0.56 -0.52 0.93
France* BS -0.40 -0.49 0.02 0.81
Gabon SS 0.71 0.72 0.34 0.45
Gambia SS 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.54
Germany* RG 0.19 0.33 -0.33 0.87
Ghana SS 0.43 0.41 0.68 0.47
Greece* BS -0.17 -0.18 0.21 0.65
Guatemala SS 0.49 0.51 0.29 0.38
Haiti SS 0.34 0.34 0.47 0.19
Honduras SS 0.22 0.24 0.19 0.38
Hong Kong RG 0.26 0.41 -0.52 0.74
India SS 0.24 0.15 0.51 0.57
Indonesia RG 0.33 0.40 -0.24 0.40
Iran SS 0.56 0.57 0.77 0.49
Ireland* EG -0.08 -0.01 -0.32 0.82
Italy* EG -0.09 -0.08 -0.14 0.70
Jamaica BS -0.32 -0.38 0.51 0.49
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Notes: The abbreviations EG, SS, RG, and BS stand for established graduate, still in school, recent graduate, and back 




 Average Average Average
1960-2009 1960-1999 2000-2009 1984-2008
Jordan SS 0.33 0.31 0.71 0.56
Kenya SS 0.51 0.48 0.74 0.52
Korea EG -0.06 -0.01 -0.52 0.65
Kuwait BS 0.07 -0.14 0.29 0.57
Libya RG 0.02 0.45 -0.26 0.48
Madagascar SS 0.47 0.53 0.29 0.50
Malaysia RG 0.39 0.48 -0.74 0.63
Mali SS 0.58 0.62 0.36 0.31
Mexico SS 0.21 0.14 0.84 0.54
Morocco RG 0.43 0.46 -0.10 0.58
Mozambique SS 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.45
Myanmar SS 0.66 0.65 0.73 0.29
Netherlands* EG -0.05 -0.03 -0.21 0.93
New Zealand* SS 0.05 0.01 0.55 0.91
Nicaragua SS 0.50 0.50 0.58 0.47
Niger SS 0.64 0.65 0.36 0.41
Nigeria RG 0.41 0.59 -0.75 0.34
Norway* RG -0.01 0.18 -0.88 0.89
Oman RG 0.71 0.76 -0.06 0.61
Pakistan SS 0.37 0.37 0.42 0.42
Panama SS 0.16 0.10 0.85 0.41
Paraguay RG 0.53 0.63 -0.14 0.38
Peru SS 0.67 0.65 0.87 0.43
Philippines RG 0.54 0.56 -0.19 0.44
Portugal* SS 0.45 0.48 0.12 0.74
Qatar SS 0.69 0.58 0.68 0.54
Saudi Arabia RG 0.61 0.68 -0.62 0.60
Senegal SS 0.47 0.46 0.75 0.46
Sierra Leone SS 0.67 0.75 0.43 0.33
South Africa SS 0.09 0.06 0.28 0.62
Spain* EG -0.26 -0.13 -0.62 0.76
Sri Lanka SS 0.11 0.01 0.67 0.48
Sudan BS -0.15 -0.17 0.18 0.29
Sweden* BS 0.08 -0.28 0.27 0.91
Switzerland* BS -0.52 -0.65 0.20 0.90
Syrian Arab Rep. RG 0.76 0.79 -0.34 0.45
Tanzania SS 0.24 0.14 0.87 0.47
Thailand SS 0.23 0.22 0.35 0.58
Togo SS 0.50 0.51 0.83 0.35
Trinidad and Tobago SS 0.76 0.77 0.73 0.58
Tunisia SS 0.48 0.48 0.73 0.55
Turkey RG 0.15 0.47 -0.70 0.54
Uganda RG 0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.42
United Arab Emirates RG -0.04 0.05 -0.12 0.57
United Kingdom* EG -0.52 -0.53 -0.43 0.87
United States* EG -0.35 -0.16 -0.94 0.87
Uruguay SS 0.31 0.27 0.81 0.50
Venezuela SS 0.45 0.40 0.68 0.44
Yemen EG -0.05 -0.04 -0.10 0.44
Zambia RG 0.16 0.18 -0.37 0.43
Country correlations between the 
cyclical components of real 








Notes: The abbreviations EG, SS, RG, and BS stand for established graduate, still in school, recent graduate, and back 
to school graduating classes, respectively. * identifies industrial countries. Figure 1. Country correlations between the cyclical components  


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Dark bars are industrial countries and light ones are developing countries. The cyclical components have been estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott Filter. A positive (negative) correlation indicates procyclical 
(countercyclical) fiscal policy. Real government expenditure is defined as central government expenditure and net lending deflated by the GDP deflator. See Appendix 2 for correlation values for each country. 
Source: World Economic Outlook and International Financial Statistics (IMF). 
  Figure 2. Country correlations between the cyclical components  


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Dark bars are industrial countries and light ones are developing countries. The cyclical components have been estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott Filter. A positive (negative) correlation indicates procyclical 
(countercyclical) fiscal policy. Real government expenditure is defined as central government expenditure and net lending deflated by the GDP deflator. See Appendix 2 for correlation values for each country. 
Source: World Economic Outlook and International Financial Statistics (IMF). 
 Figure 3. Country correlations between the cyclical components  





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Dark bars are industrial countries and light ones are developing countries. The cyclical components have been estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott Filter. A positive (negative) correlation indicates procyclical 
(countercyclical) fiscal policy. Real government expenditure is defined as central government expenditure and net lending deflated by the GDP deflator. See Appendix 2 for correlation values for each country. 
Source: World Economic Outlook and International Financial Statistics (IMF). Figure 4. Country correlations between the cyclical components  


















































Notes: The cyclical components have been estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott Filter. A positive (negative) correlation indicates procyclical (countercyclical) fiscal policy. Real government expenditure is 
defined as central government expenditure and net lending deflated by the GDP deflator. See Appendix 2 for correlation values for each country. 
Established graduates: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom, United States, and Yemen. 
Never graduated: Angola, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Cameroon, China, Colombia, Rep. of Congo, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, 
Iran, Jordan, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Mozambique, Myanmar, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Qatar, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
Back to school: Dem. Rep. of  Congo, France, Greece, Jamaica, Kuwait, Sudan, Sweden, and Switzerland. 
Recent graduates: Algeria, Bahrain, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, El Salvador, Germany, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Paraguay, 
Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Rep., Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, and Zambia. 
Source: World Economic Outlook and International Financial Statistics (IMF).  
Figure 5. Country correlations between the cyclical components of real government  
expenditure and real GDP (1960-2009) vs. average institutional quality (1984-2008) 
Corr(G, GDP) = 0.81    -    1.02 av.IQ
                          (0.09)***    (0.15)***  
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Notes: The cyclical components have been estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott Filter. A positive (negative) correlation indicates procyclical (countercyclical) fiscal policy. Real government expenditure is defined as 
central government expenditure and net lending deflated by the GDP deflator. Country correlations between the cyclical components of real government expenditure and real GDP (i.e., Corr(G, GDP)) are calculated for 
the period 1960-2009. Institutional quality is a normalized index that ranges between 0 (lowest institutional quality) and 1 (highest institutional quality). The index is calculated as the average of four components: 
investment profile, corruption, law and order, bureaucracy quality. Country average institutional quality (i.e., av. IQ) is calculated for each country for the period 1984-2008. See Appendix 2 for correlation values and 
average institutional quality for each country. 
Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), World Economic Outlook and International Financial Statistics (IMF). Figure 6. Graduation examples. Country correlations between the cyclical components of real government  
expenditure and real GDP (20-year rolling windows) vs. institutional quality 
 
















































































Corr(G, GDP) Institutional quality  
 
















































































Corr(G, GDP) Institutional quality  
 
















































































Corr(G, GDP) Institutional quality  
Notes: The cyclical components have been estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott Filter. A positive (negative) correlation indicates 
procyclical (countercyclical) fiscal policy. Real government expenditure is defined as central government expenditure and net 
lending deflated by the GDP deflator. Country correlations between the cyclical components of real government expenditure and 
real GDP (i.e., Corr(G, GDP)) are calculated as 20-year rolling windows for the period 1960-2009.  
Institutional quality is a normalized index that ranges between 0 (lowest institutional quality) and 1 (highest institutional quality). 
The index is calculated as the average of four components: investment profile, corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic quality. 
Actual institutional quality (i.e., for each year) is used. 
Institutional quality is shown on the right axis and the correlation between the cyclical components of real government  
expenditure and real GDP is shown on the left. 
Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), World Economic Outlook and International Financial Statistics (IMF). Table 1. Institutional quality statistics by graduating class  
 




Established graduate (EG) 0.82 0.84 -0.02
Still in school (SS) 0.48 0.43 0.05
Recent graduate (RG) 0.55 0.47 0.07
Back to School (BS) 0.60 0.56 0.04
Mean tests (p-value)








EG vs. BS 1.6×10
-35 0.009 5.9×10
-20
SS vs. RG 3.1×10
-19 0.346 1×10
-4
SS vs. BS 5×10
-22 0.081 0.599
RG vs. BS 4.5×10
-4 0.399 0.006
 
Notes: Institutional quality is a normalized index that ranges between 0 (lowest institutional 
quality) and 1 (highest institutional quality). The index is calculated as the average of four 
components: investment profile, corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic quality. IQ refers 
to the current institutional quality value. IQ
initial refers to earliest IQ value available for each 
country; in most cases it corresponds to the 1984 value. The only exceptions are Rep. of Congo 
(1985), Gambia (1985), Niger (1985), Sierra Leone (1985), Yemen (1990), and Azerbaijan 
(1998). ∆IQ≡IQ-IQ
initial. The mean test is a t-test on the equality of means for two groups; the 
null hypothesis is that both groups have the same mean.  




Table 2. Panel regressions. Dependent variable is the cyclical  



















(EG) (SS) (RG) (BS) (EG) (SS) (RG) (BS)
(1) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (3) (4a) (4b) (4c) (4d)
RGDP cycle 1.99*** -1.84 1.55*** 1.04** 2.95*** 2.11*** -1.73 2.43*** 1.27*** 3.33***
[11.9] [-0.8] [6.6] [2.4] [6.6] [12.1] [-0.8] [7.7] [2.8] [6.8]
RGDP cycle ˣ IQ -2.51*** 1.5 -1.19** -1.34* -4.35***
[-7.4] [0.5] [-2.3] [-1.7] [-4.6]
RGDP cycle ˣ IQ
initial -2.81*** 1.44 -3.25*** -1.41* -4.43***
[-7.7] [0.5] [-4.5] [-1.8] [-4.7]
RGDP cycle ˣ ∆IQ -1.70*** 4.78 0.05 -3.67*** -10.91***











Notes: Institutional quality is a normalized index that ranges between 0 (lowest institutional quality) and 1 (highest institutional quality). IQ refers to the current institutional 
quality value. IQ
initial refers to earliest IQ value available for each country; in most cases it corresponds to the 1984 value. ∆IQ≡IQ-IQ
initial. Estimations are performed using 
country fixed-effects. t-statistics are in square brackets. R
2 corresponds to within-R
2. Constant, IQ, IQ
initial, and ∆IQ terms are not reported. 
˟, *, ** and *** indicate statistically significant at the 15%, 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Table 3. Panel regressions. Dependent variable is the cyclical  
component of real government expenditure. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RGDP cycle 2.00*** 0.86*** 1.26*** 0.79*** 1.11*** 0.49*** 1.16*** 1.65***
[11.9] [16.5] [13.4] [13.6] [12.4] [6.3] [15.0] [4.4]
RGDP cycle ˣ IQ -2.52*** -1.54**
[-7.4] [-2.4]
RGDP cycle ˣ Financial integration -0.13*** -0.07
[-3.6] [-1.2]
RGDP cycle ˣ Financial depth -1.10*** -0.48
[-4.7] [-1.4]
RGDP cycle ˣ Output volatility 0.0004*** -0.0002
[2.9] [-0.4]
RGDP cycle ˣ Checks and balances -0.12*** -0.03
[-3.2] [-0.5]
RGDP cycle ˣ Debt-GDP ratio 0.30*** 0.23
[3.0] [1.3]
RGDP cycle ˣ Foreign reserves -0.06*** -0.03
[-4.3] [-0.9]
R² 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.12
Observations 2273 3412 2930 4089 3044 2701 2855 1278
Countries 94 94 94 94 93 93 91 85
 
Notes: Institutional quality is a normalized index that ranges between 0 (lowest institutional quality) and 1 (highest institutional quality). IQ refers to the current 
institutional quality value. Estimations are performed using country fixed-effects. t-statistics are in square brackets. R
2 corresponds to within-R
2. Constant, IQ, financial 
integration, financial depth, output volatility, checks and balances, debt-gdp ratio, and foreign reserves terms are not reported. 
˟, *, ** and *** indicate statistically significant at the 15%, 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 4. Cross-country correlations between economic, institutional,  








































































































































































































































































































































































Av. IQ -0.49 1
Financial integration -0.35 0.41 1
Financial depth -0.34 0.60 0.38 1
Output volatility 0.49 -0.37 -0.22 -0.44 1
Checks and balances -0.35 0.49 0.36 0.33 -0.31 1
Debt-GDP ratio 0.11 -0.15 -0.06 -0.14 0.24 -0.18 1
Foreign reserves 0.07 0.02 -0.06 0.19 0.04 0.28 -0.29 1
Log european settler mortality 0.47 -0.61 -0.36 -0.63 0.53 -0.46 0.37 -0.19 1
Latitude -0.36 0.54 0.24 0.50 -0.32 0.20 -0.21 0.11 -0.52 1
British colonial dummy -0.43 0.36 0.10 0.47 -0.33 0.34 -0.08 -0.07 -0.27 0.19 1
French colonial dummy 0.41 -0.25 -0.33 -0.15 0.19 -0.41 0.23 -0.22 0.38 -0.02 -0.44 1
French legal origin dummy 0.43 -0.36 -0.07 -0.36 0.34 -0.32 0.09 0.12 0.23 -0.13 -0.92 0.44 1
Democracy in 1900 -0.53 0.70 0.43 0.42 -0.34 0.36 -0.18 0.04 -0.58 0.52 0.20 -0.30 -0.11 1
Constraint on executive in 1900 -0.52 0.65 0.33 0.38 -0.31 0.36 -0.25 0.10 -0.56 0.46 0.14 -0.31 -0.03 0.95 1
Terms of trade volatility 0.20 -0.40 -0.35 -0.47 0.37 -0.40 0.28 0.08 0.43 -0.42 0.00 0.03 -0.06 -0.34 -0.32 1
Debt-GDP ratio in 1900 0.23 -0.09 -0.13 -0.12 0.16 -0.31 0.35 -0.13 0.16 -0.02 -0.39 0.38 0.39 -0.04 -0.07 0.02 1
Currency crashes in mid 20th century 0.14 0.00 -0.19 -0.18 0.23 -0.22 -0.04 0.24 0.06 0.15 -0.43 0.20 0.43 -0.06 0.02 -0.09 0.15 1
 






Table 5. Cross-country regressions. Dependent variable is the correlation between the cyclical  


































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Av. IQ -1.02*** -0.90*** -0.49** -0.57*
[-6.6] [-4.0] [-2.1] [-1.9]
Financial integration -0.10*** -0.09** -0.03 -0.03
[-4.2] [-2.7] [-1.1] [-1.0]
Financial depth -0.43*** -0.59** -0.16 0.11
[-4.0] [-2.6] [-1.1] [0.4]
Output volatility 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.05*** 0.05**
[6.9] [3.9] [3.7] [2.4]
Checks and balances -0.12*** -0.09** -0.02 -0.02
[-5.5] [-2.7] [-0.9] [-0.6]
Debt-GDP ratio 0.08 0.06 0.01 -0.01
[1.1] [0.8] [0.1] [-0.1]
Foreign reserves 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
[1.0] [0.5] [0.5] [0.4]
R² 0.32 0.24 0.16 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.34 0.24 0.25 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.53 0.38
Observations 94 52 94 52 94 52 94 52 93 52 94 52 91 52 90 52
 
Notes: See Appendix 1 for definition and source of variables. t-statistics are in square brackets. Constant term is not reported. 









 Table 6. Cross-country regressions. Dependent variables are Av. IQ, Financial integration, Financial depth,  
Output volatility, Checks and balances, Debt-GDP ratio, and Foreign reserves. 
 
Panel A. Dependent variable is Av. IQ Panel B. Dependent variable is Financial integration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log european  -0.07*** -0.02˟ -0.31*** -0.02
settler mortality [-5.5] [-1.6] [-2.7] [-0.1]
Latitude 0.59*** 0.07 1.89* 0.20
[4.6] [0.5] [1.7] [0.2]
British colonial 0.06 -0.07 0.25 -0.15
dummy [0.5] [-1.0] [0.3] [-0.2]
French colonial  -0.04 0.04 -0.89** -0.74*
dummy [-0.7] [1.0] [-2.4] [-1.9]
French legal  -0.04 -0.19** 0.41 0.45
origin dummy [-0.4] [-2.7] [0.5] [0.6]
Democracy  0.03*** 0.02 0.15*** 0.40**
in 1900 [6.9] [1.0] [3.4] [2.6]
Constraint on  0.05*** 0.01 0.17** -0.48**
executive in 1900 [6.1] [0.7] [2.5] [-2.2]
Terms of  -0.01*** -0.01 -0.10** -0.06˟
trade volatility [-3.1] [-1.3] [-2.6] [-1.6]
Debt-GDP ratio  -0.03 0.02 -0.35 -0.30
in 1900 [-0.6] [0.6] [-0.9] [-0.8]
Currency crashes 0.002 0.16 -1.55 -1.31
in mid 20th century [0.01] [1.4] [-1.4] [-1.1]
R² 0.38 0.30 0.15 0.49 0.43 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.69 0.13 0.06 0.12 0.19 0.11 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.40
Observations 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
Panel C. Dependent variable is Financial depth Panel D. Dependent variable is Output volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log european  -0.08*** -0.06*** 0.74*** 0.54**
settler mortality [-5.7] [-3.2] [4.4] [2.2]
Latitude 0.57*** 0.12 -4.15** -0.32
[4.1] [0.8] [-2.4] [-0.1]
British colonial 0.29*** 0.20** -0.43 0.70
dummy [2.9] [2.4] [-0.3] [0.6]
French colonial  0.02 0.07˟ 0.17 -0.53
dummy [0.4] [1.5] [0.3] [-0.9]
French legal  0.14 0.08 0.75 1.55
origin dummy [1.4] [0.9] [0.6] [1.3]
Democracy  0.02*** 0.0001 -0.19** 0.10
in 1900 [3.3] [0.01] [-2.6] [0.4]
Constraint on  0.03*** -0.001 -0.26** -0.20
executive in 1900 [2.9] [-0.04] [-2.3] [-0.6]
Terms of  -0.02*** -0.01** 0.17*** 0.10˟
trade volatility [-3.7] [-2.0] [2.8] [1.6]
Debt-GDP ratio  -0.05 0.01 0.70 0.08
in 1900 [-0.9] [0.4] [1.2] [0.1]
Currency crashes -0.22 -0.09 3.09* 2.28
in mid 20th century [-1.3] [-0.6] [1.7] [1.2]
R² 0.40 0.25 0.25 0.18 0.14 0.22 0.02 0.03 0.62 0.28 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.03 0.05 0.41
Observations 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
 
Notes: See Appendix 1 for definition and source of variables. t-statistics are in square brackets. Constant term is not reported. 
˟, *, ** and *** indicate statistically significant at the 15%, 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Table 6 cont. Cross-country regressions. Dependent variables are Av. IQ, Financial integration, Financial depth,  
Output volatility, Checks and balances, Debt-GDP ratio, and Foreign reserves. 
 
Panel E. Dependent variable is Checks and balances Panel F. Dependent variable is Debt-GDP ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log european  -0.41*** -0.15 0.15*** 0.10
settler mortality [-3.7] [-1.0] [2.8] [1.3]
Latitude 1.61 -0.77 -0.77˟ -0.39
[1.4] [-0.6] [-1.5] [-0.6]
British colonial 0.40 -0.24 0.09 0.39
dummy [0.5] [-0.3] [0.3] [1.1]
French colonial  -0.82** -0.38 0.28˟ 0.07
dummy [-2.2] [-1.0] [1.6] [0.4]
French legal  -0.06 -0.58 0.07 0.30
origin dummy [-0.1] [-0.8] [0.2] [0.8]
Democracy  0.13*** -0.04 -0.03 0.12˟
in 1900 [2.8] [-0.3] [-1.3] [1.6]
Constraint on  0.19*** 0.14 -0.06* -0.17˟
executive in 1900 [2.7] [0.7] [-1.8] [-1.6]
Terms of  -0.12*** -0.10** 0.03** 0.02
trade volatility [-3.1] [-2.5] [2.0] [1.1]
Debt-GDP ratio  -0.86** -0.37 0.43** 0.36*
in 1900 [-2.3] [-1.0] [2.7] [2.0]
Currency crashes -1.87˟ -1.07 -0.13 0.09
in mid 20th century [-1.6] [-0.9] [-0.3] [0.2]
R² 0.21 0.04 0.20 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.10 0.05 0.43 0.14 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.13 0.01 0.32
Observations 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
Panel G. Dependent variable is Foreign reserves
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log european  -0.34 -0.45
settler mortality [-1.4] [-1.3]
Latitude 1.79 2.53
[0.8] [0.8]
British colonial 0.87 1.01
dummy [0.6] [0.6]
French colonial  -1.64** -1.41˟
dummy [-2.1] [-1.6]
French legal  1.99 2.09
origin dummy [1.3] [1.2]
Democracy  0.03 -0.22
in 1900 [0.3] [-0.6]
Constraint on  0.11 0.15
executive in 1900 [0.7] [0.3]
Terms of  0.05 0.14˟
trade volatility [0.6] [1.6]
Debt-GDP ratio  -0.68 -0.57
in 1900 [-0.9] [-0.7]
Currency crashes 4.08* 3.45
in mid 20th century [1.8] [1.3]
R² 0.04 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.25
Observations 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
 
Notes: See Appendix 1 for definition and source of variables. t-statistics are in square brackets. Constant term is not reported. 
˟, *, ** and *** indicate statistically significant at the 15%, 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
Table 7. Instrumental variable cross-country regressions. Dependent variable is the correlation  






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Av. IQ -1.39*** -1.31*** -1.43*** -1.27*** -1.32*** -1.44*** -1.51*** -1.42***
[-6.3] [-5.4] [-4.8] [-5.0] [-5.2] [-5.5] [-5.7] [-2.6]
Financial integration -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04˟ -0.03 -0.04˟ 0.01
[-0.7] [-1.2] [-1.3] [-1.6] [-1.4] [-1.6] [0.1]
Financial depth 0.31˟ 0.48*** 0.45** 0.49*** 0.55*** 0.39
[1.5] [2.6] [2.6] [2.8] [3.1] [0.6]
Output volatility 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07*** -0.02
[3.9] [3.9] [3.9] [4.1] [-0.2]
Checks and balances 0.02 0.02 0.03˟ -0.16
[0.9] [1.2] [1.6] [-1.3]
Debt-GDP ratio -0.04 -0.07 -0.17
[-0.9] [-1.3] [-0.5]
Foreign reserves -0.02 -0.03
[-1.1] [-0.5]
Overidentification test (p-value) 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.64 0.57 0.37 0.45 0.49
Weak identification tests (p-value): 









       For Financial integration 1.4×10
-3
       For Financial depth 1.6×10
-9
       For Output volatility 6.9×10
-5
       For Checks and balances 4.5×10
-7
       For Debt-GDP ratio 2.4×10
-2
       For Foreign reserves 1.3×10
-3
Observations 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
Instrumenting only for Av. IQ
 
Notes: See Appendix 1 for definition and source of variables. t-statistics are in square brackets. The weak-identification test is the first-stage F test of excluded 
instruments; the null hypothesis is that the model is weakly identified (i.e., the excluded instruments have a nonzero correlation with the endogenous regressors but 
small). The over-identification test is the Hansen's J statistic; the null hypothesis is that the instruments are exogenous (i.e., uncorrelated with the error term). Constant 
term is not reported. 
˟, *, ** and *** indicate statistically significant at the 15%, 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 